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COMPETITOR REGULATION OF 
SPONSORED CONTENT IN THE NEW 
SPORTS CONTENT MEDIA ECONOMY 
KALI MURRAY* 
ABSTRACT 
Sports advertising formats, like all other types of advertising strategy and 
campaigns, are becoming increasingly diverse.  Sponsored content, in which 
advertising content is integrated specifically into editorial content, has become 
a new way to generate revenue in a diverse media sport content economy.  Part 
II examines the spectrum of sponsored content in sports media.  Part III analyzes 
how the types of claims might arise under the Lanham Act of 1946 for sponsored 
content.  I conclude that sponsored content demonstrates how the regulation of 
competition through intellectual property challenges may face challenges in the 
new media sport content economy. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sports media in the twenty-first century, no longer consigned to standard 
print media, such as newspapers and magazines or standard broadcast media, 
has achieved startling diversity.  Independent sports blogs, such as Deadspin1 
and Bleacher Report,2 cover a range of general sports issues, while other sports 
blogs, such as American Soccer Now3 and Saturday Down South,4 cover niche 
subjects, like soccer and college football, respectively.  Micro-blogs, such as 
Twitter and Facebook, permit sports figures, like Lebron James, to comment on 
sports-related events directly to their followers.5  Sports information is also gen-
erated through sport fantasy leagues6 and visual media, such as YouTube and 
                                         
* Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. 
1 See generally DEADSPIN, http://www.deadspin.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).  
2 See generally BLEACHER REPORT, http://bleacherreport.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
3 See generally Am. Soccer Now, http://www.americansoccernow.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
4 See generally Saturday Down S., http://www.saturdaydownsouth.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
5 See generally LeBron James, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/KingJames (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
6 Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How America Regulates Its New 
National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 11–25 (2012) (outlining the types of fantasy games 
and the various stakeholders).  
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video games.  This new, sports-related diverse media is multi-platform, span-
ning digital, desktop, and mobile devices,7 and includes both traditional media 
owners, like ESPN or CBS Sports,8 as well as independent owners, like Gawker 
Media and Vox Media.9   
Brett Hutchins and David Rowe identified the emergence of this range of 
sports media as a key shift in what they term “the media sport content econ-
omy.”10  Hutchins and Rowe note that the preexisting order of sports media was 
based on a traditional broadcast model, which was based on “guaranteeing a 
‘scarcity’ of distribution channels for high-quality, popular content—only a lim-
ited number of television networks possessed the production and distribution 
capacity and capital to broadcast major sporting competitions and events.”11  
Hutchins and Rowe contend, however, that the “architecture” of this media 
sports content economy has shifted within the advent of digital networks such 
as the Internet.12  
The diversity of new sports media has also led to the emergence of new 
advertising formats.  Diverse advertising formats include product placement, 
advergames, banner ads, interactive digital formats, and sponsored content.13  
These advertising formats, according to Patrick de Pelsmacker and Peter C. Nei-
jens, share one key characteristic, that is, “they try to conceal the persuasive 
intent of the commercial messages embedded in them. . . . by means of devel-
oping pleasurable, flow-inducing and less intrusive formats.”14  While the rele-
vant scholarly literature has had an impact on the new advertising format of 
                                         
7 Gian Fulgoni & Andrew Lipsman, Digital Game Changers: How Social Media Will Help Usher 
in the Era of Mobile and Multi-Platform Campaign-Effectiveness Measurement, 54 J. ADVERTISING 
RES. 11, 11–12 (2014).  
8 See generally CBSSPORTS, http://www.cbssports.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2014); ESPN, 
http://espn.go.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
9 See generally GAWKER, http://gawker.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2014); VOX MEDIA, 
http://www.voxmedia.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
10 Brett Hutchins & David Rowe, From Broadcast Scarcity to Digital Plenitude: The Changing 
Dynamics of the Media Sport Content Economy, 10 TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 354, 355 (2009). 
11 Id. at 355–56.  
12 Id. at 355.   
13 See Patrick de Pelsmacker & Peter C. Neijens, New Advertising Formats: How Persuasion 
Knowledge Affects Consumer Responses, 18 J. MARKETING COMM. 1, 1 (2012).  
14 Id. (citation omitted). 
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sports law—such as athlete endorsements in social media like Twitter and Fa-
cebook,15 as well as the impact of banner advertisements16—this paper considers 
how to address the increasing importance of one type of advertising: sponsored 
content and its impact in sports-related media.  
Sponsored content, which is also referred to as native advertising, is broadly 
defined as “the integration of commercial content into editorial content.”17  Jo-
seph Dean Moore has identified four common elements specific to sponsored 
content that distinguishes it from traditional advertising:  
 
The placement is paid for by a third party who is not the pub-
lisher; it is often created by the host publication’s advertising 
or marketing staff, and sometime [sic] even its editorial staff, 
in consultation with the sponsor; it appears within the con-
tent/editorial stream of the host publication’s site (hence the 
“native” part); and it is clearly distinguishable from traditional 
display advertising.18  
 
Examples of sponsored content include:19 video-content series on specific 
topics identified by the advertiser;20 content embedded into streaming material 
on micro-blogs such as Facebook;21 and content placed in news articles that re-
sembles products produced by the advertiser.22 Eva van Reijmersdal and Ka-
rolina Tutaj note that sponsored content has significant persuasive value to con-
sumers, noting that the sponsored content, as compared to other types of 
                                         
15 Natasha Brison et al., Tweets and Crumpets: Examining U.K. and U.S. Regulation of Athlete 
Endorsements and Social Media Marketing, 23 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 55, 58, 62–69 (2013).  See 
generally Steve McKelvey & James T. Masteralexis, This Tweet Sponsored by . . . : The Application of 
the New FTC Guides to the Social Media World of Professional Athletes, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
222 (2011). 
16 Jack F. Williams, The Coming Revenue Revolution in Sports, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 669, 688–
89 (2006) (analyzing the use of ads on different playing fields). 
17 Karolina Tutaj & Eva A. van Reijmersdal, Effects of Online Advertising Format and Persuasion 
Knowledge on Audience Reactions, 18 J. MARKETING COMM. 5, 7 (2012).  
18 Joseph Dean Moore, News Goes Native: An Examination of Online Media’s Disclosure Practices 
for Sponsored Content, DIGITAL COMMONS@U. NEB. – LINCOLN (Apr. 2014), digitalcom-
mons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=journalismdiss.  
19 The examples are taken from FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BLURRED LINES: ADVERTISING OR 
CONTENT? AN FTC WORKSHOP ON NATIVE ADVERTISING (2013), available at www.ftc.gov/sys-
tem/files/documents/public_events/171321/final_transcript_1.pdf.  
20 Id. at 43–44.  
21 Id. at 46–47.  
22 Id. at 48–49.  
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advertising formats such as banner advertising, “does affect perceived advertis-
ing value: the subtle sponsored content item was found to be more informative, 
more amusing, and less irritating than the prominent banner ad.  Internet users 
seem to enjoy reading sponsored content more than encountering banner ads on 
informational websites.”23   
Sponsored content, given its blurring of the legal lines between editorials 
and advertising within the context of journalism and its accompanying persua-
sive value, raises a key legal risk, namely the inability of consumers to perceive 
that what is presented content is actually sponsored content.  This is particularly 
a problem within sports media, as a result of its innovation in the area of spon-
sored content, as discussed supra.  Given its increased importance, this paper 
considers the relationship of sponsored content within sports-related media.  
Part II examines the types of sponsored content that have appeared within the 
context of sports media on a spectrum.  Part III examines the type of harm posed 
by sponsored content and contends that it is best resolved through a false affili-
ation claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  I conclude that the emer-
gence of false affiliation claims suggests the difficulties in regulation of spon-
sored content in intellectual property law. 
 
II. THE SPECTRUM OF SPONSORED CONTENT IN THE NEWS SPORTS MEDIA 
ECONOMY 
Simone Murray contends,  
 
At the core of the contemporary phenomenon of media brand-
ing lies the abstraction of content from the constraints of any 
specific analogue media format. Content has come to be con-
ceptualized in a disembodied, almost Platonic, form: any media 
brand which successfully gains consumer loyalty can be trans-
lated across formats to create a raft of interrelated products, 
which then work in aggregate to drive further consumer aware-
ness of the media brand.24  
 
In many respects, sponsored content is a logical outcome of making content 
the focus of branding efforts, insofar as it makes advertisements another type of 
                                         
23  Tutaj & van Reijmersdal, supra note 17, at 15. 
24 Simone Murray, Brand Loyalties: Rethinking Content Within Global Corporate Media, 27 MEDIA 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 415, 417 (2005).   
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content.  This section considers the spectrum of sponsored content available 
within the current media environment.  Analyzing sponsored content within a 
spectrum is helpful to examine the ways in which different organizational 
choices might prompt distinct legal risks.  Understanding this axis—the current 
media environment—is helpful, insomuch as it helps to categorize the range of 
sponsored content within a spectrum.25  
Three factors are determinative in my selection of where sports-related 
sponsor-content should be placed on a given spectrum: platform media, adver-
tising vehicles, and cross-platform analysis.  First, platform describes the media 
in which the sponsored content is placed.26  Platforms include live experiences, 
such as lectures, sporting events, and conferences; print media, such as newspa-
pers, magazines, books, and brochures; digital media, such as websites, blogs, 
micro-blogs, Internet search engines, and social networks; and mobile plat-
forms, such as phones, tablets, and video game devices.  Second, advertising 
vehicles are the ways that the sponsored content is delivered.27  Advertising ve-
hicles can include text, visual presentations, such as film or video clips, or a 
type of live performance, such as sports events.  Finally, cross-media platform 
analyzes the ways in which platform and advertising vehicles can be used to-
gether to enhance the contribution of all other media.28  Based on a number of 
these categories, sponsored content within sports media can be considered on a 
spectrum with three primary categories: legacy-sponsored content, origina-
tor-sponsored content, and seamless sponsored content (see Figure 1).   
 
 
 
                                         
25 See, e.g., Rachel L. Stroude, Complimentary Creation: Protecting Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 14 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 191, 193–98 (2010) (analyzing fan-fiction employing a spectrum anal-
ysis).  
26See Jennifer Taylor et al., Is the Multi-Platform Whole More Powerful Than Its Separate Parts? 
Measuring the Sales Effects of Cross-Media Advertising, 53 J. ADVERTISING RES. 200, 200 (2013) (an-
alyzing the different types of platforms involved in advertisement). 
27 See John Turner et al., Scheduling of Dynamic In-Game Advertising, 59 OPERATIONS RES. 1, 2 
(2011).  
28 See Taylor et al., supra note 26, at 200–01.   
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FIGURE 1 
 
Legacy-sponsored content emerges from pre-existing media players, often 
uses a single advertising vehicle, and has not typically been integrated into every 
form of media.  Several examples of legacy-sponsored content exist within the 
current landscape: 
 
 In April 2013, ESPN the Magazine incorporated sponsored 
content advertisement by Coors Light as an illustrated sidebar 
of a magazine article.29    
 USA Today has established a website entitled FTW (“For the 
Win”) that displays sponsored content integrated into the edi-
torial news stream.  These materials are both video- and text-
based sponsored content.30 
 Sports Illustrated incorporated an advertisement for SAP into a 
filmed video presentation by children that were acting as jour-
nalists.31 
 
Legacy-sponsored content derives its persuasive value from the name 
recognition generated by pre-existing media brands.32  The persuasive value of 
                                         
29 Emma Bazilian, ESPN: The Magazine Puts a Print Spin on Sponsored Content, ADWEEK (Apr. 
29, 2013), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/espn-magazine-puts-print-spin-spon-
sored-content-148990.   
30 Clair Lorell, FTW: How USA Today Mastered Viral Sports Content, DIGIDAY (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://digiday.com/publishers/usa-today-ftw/. 
31 Sponsored Content: GENYOUth Kid Journalists Interview Athletes, Execs at SAP Sapphire Now 
Conference, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED KIDS (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.sikids.com/sikidstv/sponsored-
content-genyouth-kid-journalists-interview-athletes-execs-at-sap-sapphire-now-con. 
32 Dan Levy, Building a Digital Legacy: Q&A with The Atlantic’s Kimberly Lau, SPARKSHEET (Jan. 
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legacy-sponsored sports content was amplified to the extent that media brands, 
such as Sports Illustrated and ESPN the Magazine, operated within a closed 
media ecosystem. 
The second type of sponsored content, originator-sponsored content, has 
emerged from new digital brands, whether in blogs, websites, micro-blogs, or 
other social networks.  This type of sponsored content differs significantly from 
legacy advertising media insofar as sponsored content is often undertaken in 
multiple advertising vehicles and is deliberately cross-platform, incorporating 
methods through video and text-based strategies.  Examples of originator-spon-
sored content include the following:  
 
 The blog BuzzFeed has posted an article, Meet Ben Jackson: 
The 21-Year-Old Athlete with Cerebral Palsy Who Defied All 
Odds, that integrates a commercial of Jackson produced by Ga-
torade with an associated text that references the commercial.  
A Gatorade trademark is super-imposed on the video. The term 
Gatorade is also imposed at the bottom of each video.  Other-
wise, the ad appears to be similar to other types of BuzzFeed 
content.33 
 The blog SB Nation has posted an article entitled Video: Brian 
Stann Embodies the Marines’ Mental and Physical Fitness that 
integrates text that describes the activities of Brian Stann, an 
Ultimate Fighting Champion, with an advertisement prepared 
by the United States Marine Corps.  The text appears as an ar-
ticle by author Mark Uttford, with a subtle acknowledgement 
to the sponsor, the Marine Corps of Sports, written at the top of 
the page.34  
 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan Sports Ana-
lytics Conference permitted sponsors to submit a televised 
speech presentation that was then distributed on the Internet.35 
 
The emergence of originator-sponsored content reflects what Brett Hutchins 
and David Rowe have referred to as the “digital plenitude” in the new media 
                                         
20, 2014), http://sparksheet.com/building-a-digital-legacy-qa-with-the-atlantics-kimberly-lau/.   
33 Brian Truong, Meet Ben Jackson: The 21-Year-Old Athlete with Cerebral Palsy Who Defied All 
Odds, BUZZFEED (July 22, 2014 4:03 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/briantron/meet-ben-jackson.    
34 Matt Ufford, Brian Stann Embodies the Marines’ Mental and Physical Fitness, SBNATION (Apr. 
17, 2012), http://www.sbnation.com/2012/4/17/2955134/video-brian-stann-marine-core-of-sports-
mental-physical-fitness.  
35Content & Videos, MIT SLOAN SPORTS ANALYTICS CONF., http://www.sloansportsconfer-
ence.com/?page_id=481&sort_cate=Sponsored%20Presentation (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).  
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sports economy.36  Hutchins and Rowe contend that, “[o]nline sport content 
[distribution] mechanisms, particularly video streaming and download technol-
ogies, are restructuring the media sport content economy by creating ‘digital 
plenitude’ where once there was comparative scarcity in terms of quality content 
and channels of communication.”37  In many respects, the sponsored content in 
these new forms of digital media might be more persuasive than in legacy con-
tent because a consumer’s expectations as to a distinct relationship between ad-
vertising and editorial content may not be as fully formed in the new digital 
environment.38   
 The last category within the new media environment is seamless spon-
sored content.  Seamless sponsored content differs from the two previous cate-
gories of sponsored content in sports media since the advertiser itself generates 
sports-related advertising vehicles across a number of media platforms, includ-
ing live sport events.  Examples of seamless sports content include the follow-
ing:  
 
 Mountain Dew (a brand of PepsiCo) now sponsors a website 
entitled Green Label.  Green Label resembles a blog with inde-
pendently drafted material on different subject matter.  Covered 
subject matter includes sound, action, art, style, places, and 
gaming.  Green Label also covers its sports-related Dew Tour.  
Mountain Dew’s sponsorship is noted on the page as a Moun-
tain Dew Venture, and the title of the blog is Green Label, 
which may be alluding to the trade dress associated with Moun-
tain Dew products.39 
 International Business Machines (IBM) generates televisual in-
formation on a variety of sports-related activities through its 
broader branding effort, Smarter Planet.40   
 
Seamless sponsored content is a major shift within the sports media econ-
                                         
36 See generally Hutchins & Rowe, supra note 10.  
37 Id. at 356.  
38 See Patrick Howe & Brady Teufel, Native Advertising and Digital Natives: The Effects of Age 
and Advertisement Format on News Website Credibility Judgments, 4 INT’L SYMP. ON ONLINE 
JOURNALISM 78, 86 (2014) (showing study determined that subjects were not able to distinguish ad-
vertisement on sponsored website page).  
39 See Stuart Elliott, Brought to You by Mountain Dew, NYTimes (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/04/26/business/media/mountain-dew-to-introduce-a-sponsored-web-site.html.  See 
generally Green Label, http://green-label.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).   
40 See generally IBM SPORTS, http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/sports/ (last visited Dec. 2, 
2014).  
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omy for two basic reasons.  First, the content is neutral information that is gen-
erated by the advertiser.  Second, the content is linked across platforms to spe-
cific live sporting events.  Both of these features are intended to intensify affin-
ity between advertisers and their audience, sports consumers, based upon their 
social identity choices.  Recent research into sports sponsorship suggests that 
social identity and sporting events offer a particularly powerful type of sponsor-
ship because of their ability to connect to cognitive, normative, and affective 
social identity components.41  Indeed, George Deitz, Susan Myers, and Marla 
Stafford have noted that “persuasion in response to sponsorship information 
may occur through multiple routes, with social [identification] acting as the key 
exogenous variable.”42 
Analyzing the platform on a spectrum-analysis helps to identify and char-
acterize the legal risk associated with sponsored content within a media sports 
economy.  A simple way to characterize the legal risk associated with the spec-
trum of sponsored content is that a consumer may be misled or deceived about 
the relationship of the advertiser to the sponsored content, diverting the con-
sumer away from other competitive products.  Thus, a straightforward way to 
resolve the legal risk is to disclose the relationship of the parties to one another, 
typically through the phrase “sponsored content,” or a surrounding visual de-
piction that differentiates the sponsored content from other forms of editorial 
content.  This has typically been the approach of legacy-sponsored platforms: 
for example, in its sponsored content contained within ESPN the Magazine, 
ESPN notes its relationship with Coors Light with the language “COLD HARD 
FACTS, PRESENTED by Coors LIGHT.”43  The sponsorship is further clari-
fied in the ESPN sponsored content because the trademark associated with 
Coors Light accompanies the material.44  The disclosure of sponsorship by the 
advertiser is apparent to all; therefore, the legal risk is apparently resolved.    
 The legal risk in sponsored content, however, is not resolved through 
simple disclosure of the sponsorship.  First, as the above example illustrates, 
even simple disclosure is not so simple: the term used to indicate the relationship 
between Coors Light and ESPN is presented as opposed to the more direct term 
sponsor.  A textual failure to distinguish between the advertiser and the content 
                                         
41 George D. Deitz et al., Understanding Consumer Response to Sponsorship Information: A Re-
source-Matching Approach, 29 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 226, 229 (2012). See also Kevin Gwinner & 
Gregg Bennett, The Impact of Brand Cohesiveness and Sport Identification on Brand Fit in a Sponsor-
ship Context, 22 J. SPORT MGMT. 410, 421 (2008) (“The results of this study provide evidence that fit 
is positively influenced by sport identification and brand cohesiveness, in this case among those attend-
ing an action sports event.”). 
42 Deitz et al., supra note 41, at 229. 
43 See Bazilian, supra note 29.  
44 Id.  
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producer might create significant confusion over the source of the material.  In-
deed, recent scholarship indicates that consumers of sponsored media, particu-
larly older viewers, have difficulty in distinguishing between sponsored content 
and editorial content, even where disclosure may be apparent.45  
Second, analyzing sponsored content within a spectrum indicates other legal 
risks besides confusion over the relationship between the sponsor and the ad-
vertiser.  Specifically, seamless sponsored content media contemplates, at its 
core, the method of “disguise,” that is the consumer may not be able to distin-
guish between the advertiser and the creator at all.  Green Label, on its face, 
looks like legacy and originator media.  Green Label creates its own original 
commentary, some of which is related to the brand Mountain Dew, and some of 
which is independent of the brand Mountain Dew.  Sponsorship, therefore, is 
disguised from the consumer through the blurring of the lines of what consti-
tutes a creator in advertisement.  This blurring is intensified within the context 
of sports sponsorship because of the heightened way consumers experience live 
sporting events.  In particular, attendance at a live sporting event is accompanied 
by heightened social identification that might increase the risk that the consumer 
would fail to distinguish between the advertiser and the sponsor.  Thus, spon-
sored content creates a significant legal risk by blurring the lines between ad-
vertiser, content creator, and consumer.  This blurring is intensified signifi-
cantly, depending on the type of sponsored content at issue.     
III.  PRIVATE REGULATION OF SPORTS-SPONSORED CONTENT THROUGH THE 
LANHAM ACT OF 1946 
How, then, do we address the legal risks that accompany the emergence of 
sponsored content within the new media sports content economy?  A key ele-
ment of the harm of sponsored content is that the parties fail to disclose the 
relationship between the parties, the parties misrepresent the relationship be-
tween the parties, or the parties disclose the relationship in a confusing manner.  
This risk, as discussed infra, is intensified within the context of sport-sponsored 
content because of social identification that accompanies sports-related content.   
One key method of regulation may be through a claim of federal unfair 
competition law under Section 43 of the Lanham Act of 1946.  Section 43 of 
the Lanham Act of 1946 is understood to be the primary source of the federal 
law of unfair competition, a flexible term that encompasses a range of harms 
related to the misrepresentations of the nature, quality, or source of a good or 
service.46  
                                         
45 See Howe & Teufel, supra note 38, at 85.  
46 Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should be the Reach of Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 673 (1984) (defining the term unfair competition).  
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Three categories of unfair competition are available under Section 43(a)(1) 
of the Lanham Act.  First, Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act contemplates 
that the deceptive and misleading use of a trademark is a form of federal unfair 
competition.47  Second, Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act contemplates 
that a false association claim is available for a range of claims related to the 
false, deceptive, or misleading relationship between business parties.  Third, 
Section 43(a)(1)(B), typically referred to as a false advertising claim, contem-
plates any description or representation of fact in a commercial advertisement 
or promotion that misrepresents the nature, qualities, or geographic origin of the 
defendant’s or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.48  A 
civil claim is likely to be possible for a harm caused by sponsored content across 
the spectrum.  Figure 2 depicts the potential claims that might be raised under 
Section 43(a) as to sponsored content claims. 
 
 
 
 
                                         
The term is also referred to as unfair trade practice.  1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §4.11 (4th ed. 2014).  
 
In an attempt to find a term that embraces all aspects of trademark infringement, unfair 
competition, misappropriation, dilution of marks, false advertising, etc., some have used 
the designation “Unfair Trade Practices”.  Such a broad term as “unfair trade practices” 
recognizes that illegal practices are not limited to cases where the parties are in actual com-
petition. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
47 Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767–68 (1992). See also 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1) (2006).  A civil remedy is available for: 
 
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for 
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the 
origin, [sponsorship], or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person . . . . 
Id.  
48 The Supreme Court has recently recognized that “[s]ection 1125(a) thus creates two distinct bases 
of liability: false association, § 1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising, § 1125(a)(1)(B).”  Lexmark Int'l, 
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., No. 12-873 U.S. slip op. at 3 (U.S. 2014) (citation omitted). 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Section 43(a), therefore, can potentially serve as a locus for the type of 
harms that may arise within the context of false advertising claims.  A closer 
look, however, suggests that there may be significant limits associated with 
these claims under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as to the spectrum of spon-
sored content.  
All three claims may confront an initial hurdle insofar as sponsored content 
may not be actionable under the Lanham Act because the advertiser and the 
generator of the content are in a legitimate business relationship, and therefore, 
the use of the trademarks, the sponsorship, or affiliation relationship is a legiti-
mate one.  While the precedent as to this claim is relatively thin, courts and 
administrative bodies have been reluctant to permit a claim of trademark in-
fringement where the parties are already engaged in a legitimate relationship.  
For example, in Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Churchfield Publications,49 a 
                                         
49 756 F. Supp. 1393 (D. Or. 1990).  The WIPO Mediation and Arbitration Center, in its resolution 
of disputes over domain name, requires that the parties share no legitimate business relationship to 
allege domain name infringement.  See, e.g., Aktieselskabet af 21. November 2001 A/S v. Jun Li aka 
Li Jun, Case No. D2011–1219, at 3 (WIPO Admin. Panel 2011), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/do-
mains/decisions/text/2011/d2011-1219.html (“The Complainant contends that it has not licensed or 
Section 
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district court held that a deliberate misrepresentation under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act could not be invoked where the defendants produced evidence of 
a legitimate business relationship with advertisers through the existence of a 
sponsorship contract.50   
This question of a pre-existing legitimate business relationship is likely to 
limit the ability to raise a trademark infringement claim.  Sponsored content is 
likely to utilize multiple trademarks51 that may generate consumer confusion as 
to the source of the good in question (the article).  Consumers might be confused 
as to use of one mark (the content generator) to generate positive identification 
of another’s mark (the advertiser).  Sponsored content, however, presumes the 
existence of a binary contractual relationship between the two relevant parties, 
thus offering each party no incentive to bring a claim against another party.  
These pre-existing agreements are likely to limit trademark infringement litiga-
tion as to sponsored content.  Such limits of the kind of trademark infringement 
suggest the ways in which utilizing competitive private regulators can prove to 
be ineffective within an overall scheme of regulation. 
Notwithstanding this potential hurdle, the claims under Section 43(a) re-
lated to claims of false advertising and false association are likely to be more 
successful.  A potential response to this particular claim may stress that, while 
a legitimate business relationship might exist between the parties in relationship 
to the use of the trade works, the fact that the parties jointly create the inaccurate 
content prompts the possibility that the resulting content will violate either the 
false advertising or false association prongs of Section 43(a).  The false adver-
tising claim under Section 43(a)(1)(B), in many respects, is a relatively straight-
forward claim that is likely to be directed to the actual content contained within 
the sponsored content.  Section 43(a)(1)(B) is directed specifically to statements 
that are made in commercial advertising or promotion directed towards, what 
                                         
otherwise permitted the Respondent to use its ONLY trade mark or register domain names incorporat-
ing its trade marks.  There is no business relationship between the parties.”); Avon Prod., Inc. v. Simon 
Lee / Domains by Proxy, Inc., Case No. D2010–0668, at 2 (WIPO Admin. Panel 2010), 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/text/2010/d2010-0668.html (“Further, the Complain-
ant has not given any license, permission or other right by which the Respondent could own or use any 
domain name incorporating the Complainant's AVON trademark, and there is no business relationship 
whatsoever between the Respondent and Complainant.”); Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Michel Galar-
neau, Case No. 2001–1448, at 4 (WIPO Admin. Panel 2002), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/de-
cisions/html/2001/d2001-1448.html (“At no time has the Respondent been authorized or licensed by 
the Complainant to utilize the Complainant's trade name or trademark.  There is no business relationship 
between Complainant and the Respondent.”). 
50 Official Airline Guides, Inc., 756 F.Supp. 2d at 1405–06.  
51 For instance, BuzzFeed and Gatorade, in their advertorial, integrate BuzzFeed’s trademark with 
the super-imposed term Gatorade in the video and on the bottom of the page.   
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Thomas Williams52 notes, are two actionable categories of analysis: (1) an ac-
tionable misrepresentation as to “the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geo-
graphic origin” that it is applied to, and (2) “goods, services, or commercial 
activities.”53  Thus, false advertising claims are likely to be relevant to the con-
tent, such as factual representation, that is contained within the sponsored con-
tent.  The claims, however, are unlikely to apply to what is potentially disturbing 
in sponsored content—that is, the affiliation between the advertiser and the con-
tent generator in creating the new communicative product.  
 Therefore, the most potentially relevant claim that could be applied to spon-
sored content is a false association claim under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lan-
ham Act.  False association under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act is tied 
to the statutory language that permits recovery when a person utilizes a trade-
mark, a false designation or origin, or false or misleading description or repre-
sentation of fact that causes confusion, mistake, or description as to either “the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as 
to the origin, [sponsorship], or approval of his or her goods, services, or com-
mercial activities by another person.”54  Although this distinction is not always 
clearly made within the relevant case law,55 false association appears to encom-
pass three primary types of claims: (1) false affiliation claims, in which a claim 
is made that any symbol, device, or product made by one person is mistakenly 
affiliated with another person;56 (2) false endorsement claims, in which a claim 
                                         
52 See generally THOMAS M. WILLIAMS, FALSE ADVERTISING AND THE LANHAM ACT: LITIGATING 
SECTION 43(A)(1)(B) 2 (2012) (citing 15 U.S.C.§ 1125(a)(1)(B)).  
53 Id. at 2, 4 (citing 15 U.S.C.§1125(a)(1)(B)). 
54 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
55 The primary confusion appears to be the conflation of the first clause of 15 U.S.C. 
§1125(a) with the second clause of 15 U.S.C. §1125(a).  See id. at 1125(a).  The text of the clause, 
through its use of the term “or” appears to suggest that two types of claims are potentially available for 
a claim under §1125.  Id.  
56 Faulkner Literary Rights, LLC v. Sony Pictures Classics Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 701, 712 (N.D. 
Miss. 2013) (analyzing an affiliation claim under the Lanham Act); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F. 
Supp. 2d 1090, 1097–98 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (recognizing a false affiliation claim under Section 43(a)(1) 
made in relationship to material placed on Facebook).  False affiliation claims are primarily raised 
within the content of Section 43(a)(1)(A) but can also be raised within the context of Section 
43(a)(1)(B), as well.  See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000).  
 
It is therefore apparent, in the context of the Act's broad purpose of proscribing unfair com-
petition and the 1988 amendment of § 43(a), that Congress did not intend to narrowly limit 
the term “commercial activities,” but rather intended to encompass those activities which 
do not solely involve the provision of services or the production of goods.  Properly con-
strued, the term “commercial activities” in § 43(a) encompasses P & G's use of the profits 
from the sale of its goods.  The district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants-
appellees on the ground that the subject message did not directly implicate “goods” or “ser-
vices” was improvident because P & G has shown a genuine issue of material fact exists as 
to whether the subject message is actionable under the “commercial activities” prong of § 
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is made where there was a use of any symbol or device which is likely to deceive 
consumers as to the association, sponsorship, or approval of goods or services 
by another person;57 and (3) false attribution claims, where a claim is made that 
there is a product that misleads or deceives as to the claim of authorship.58 
  Of the claims available under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, 
false affiliation claims are most likely to capture the primary harms incurred by 
sponsored content, which arise from a misuse or misrepresentation of the rela-
tionship between the two parties that generate the sponsored content.  False af-
filiation claims are commonly tied to the improper use of a trademark,59 but 
false affiliation claims can also be tied to the failure to disclose an affiliation 
between parties.  For instance, a district court in Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc.,60 
addressed a false affiliation claim where the plaintiff had alleged that the parties 
shared an attorney-client relationship that was no longer in force.61  One primary 
issue, however, may impact a claim under false affiliation: a false affiliation 
claim is relatively under-theorized in relation to false endorsement and false 
attribution claims, thus confusing their relationship to Lanham Act claims gen-
erally.  Thus, precedent remains relatively sparse in this area of law.  
False endorsement claims are tied specifically to the improper use of an-
other’s persona, such as trade name, name, or persona characteristic, in such a 
manner to cause consumer confusion.  As the Ninth Circuit noted in Waits v. 
Frito-Lay, Inc.,  
 
A false endorsement claim based on the unauthorized use of a 
                                         
43(a)(1)(B). 
 
Id.  
57 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Brown v. Elec, Arts, Inc., 
724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 
Although claims under § 43(a) generally relate to the use of trademarks or trade dress to 
cause consumer confusion over affiliation or endorsement, we have held that claims can 
also be brought under § 43(a) relating to the use of a public figure’s persona, likeness, or 
other uniquely distinguishing characteristic to cause such confusion. 
 
Id. 
58 See, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he case law does suggest 
that the Lanham Act does not create a duty of express attribution, but does protect against misattribu-
tion.”). 
59 U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Kresch, 943 F. Supp. 802, 811 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (examining a false affilia-
tion claim in which the plaintiff failed to show that defendant had failed to use the mark). See also Parks 
v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2003) (outlining cases that involve marks). 
60 See generally 543 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008). 
61 Id. at 8–9. 
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celebrity’s identity is a type of false association claim, for it 
alleges the misuse of a trademark, i.e., a symbol or device such 
as a visual likeness, vocal imitation, or other uniquely distin-
guishing characteristic, which is likely to confuse consumers as 
to the plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval of the product.62 
 
Thus, false endorsement protects against misuse of a persona within the 
context of advertisement.63  The harm, however, in sponsored content derives 
from the potentially misleading nature of the relationship between the advertiser 
and the content generator as to the communicative product that is being created.   
As with false endorsement claims, false attribution claims seem to be re-
sponsive to the harms that may occur where the originator of the work, the ad-
vertiser, is not sufficiently disclosed by the content generator.  A false attribu-
tion claim, however, faces significant legal risks in the face of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.64 In the 
Dastar majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a claim for false attribution could be raised under Section 
43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, when one company relabeled and sold a video 
series (in which the copyright had expired) that had been previously sold by 
another company.65  The Supreme Court held that the failure to list the original 
copyright owner on the video series was not a false attribution under Section 
43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act.66  Specifically, the Court concluded the phrase 
“origin of goods” was intended to refer to the trademark holder as a “producer 
of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, 
concept, or communication embodied in those goods.”67  In doing so, the Su-
preme Court stressed that the purpose of trademark law is to protect consumer’s 
perception of the brand and to extend attribution to the creator of the brand 
would prove too over-inclusive in covering communicative products that would 
likely be the subject of an alternative claim in copyright or patent law.68  
The Supreme Court’s holding in Dastar, then, is likely to be preclusive for 
                                         
62 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110. 
63 False endorsement claims related to athlete persona have also been raised.  See Brown v. Elec, 
Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2013) (outlining Jim Brown’s athletic career). See also 
Unique Sports Prods. Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 512 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2007) 
(false endorsement claim raised by license of athletic endorser).  
64 539 U.S. 23 (2003).  
65 Id. at 25–27. 
66 Id. at 37–38. 
67 Id. at 37. 
68 Id. at 32–34.  
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claims of sponsored content.  First, it is not entirely clear whether advertisers 
use sponsored content to convey the claim as to a specific set of tangible goods.  
Rather, sponsored content is designed for the purpose of communicating a set 
of ideas about the brand itself.  For generators of seamless, sports-sponsored 
content, such as Mountain Dew’s Green Label, the goal is to generate new in-
formation—that may or may not be information about the product itself—that 
serves to facilitate intense social identification with the overall brand.  Second, 
sponsored content is creative content, material that is likely to be communica-
tive in nature (i.e., a copyrighted video, a copyrighted article, a copyrighted col-
lection of images).  Thus, sponsored content violates the binary relationship de-
tailed in Dastar as to what the Supreme Court deems the doctrinal content of 
trademark law (the product), as opposed to content of copyright law and patent 
law, which is designed to protect the creators.  Instead, sponsored content is 
simultaneously a product and a creative communication.  In many respects, this 
suggests that the way in which the Supreme Court held in Dastar fails to antic-
ipate the impact of a changing media environment.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The regulation of sponsored content is bound by two key choices: what is 
the type of information that should be regulated and who should regulate the 
relevant information.  First, regulation of sponsored content falls within a broad 
category of regulated information that Michael Gyrnberg refers to as consumer 
information law, which regulates “the production and dissemination of infor-
mation relevant to consumers in making purchasing decisions.”69  Categories of 
consumer information, according to Gyrnberg, can include trademark law, false 
advertising law, state tort and contract law, and administrative regulation of un-
fair and deceptive advertising.70  Second, which entity should regulate spon-
sored content is an ongoing question.  Consumer information regulation is a 
complex combination of public regulation, through entities such as the Federal 
Trade Commission or the state attorney general, and private regulation, through 
the intellectual property regulation of trademarks, false advertising, and false 
affiliation litigation within the Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  Thus, con-
sumer information law is an area in which there is a “systematic deployment of 
private power in controlling what are regarded as public activities.”71    
To date, the primary deployment of regulation of sponsored content has 
                                         
69 Michael Grynberg, More Than IP: Trademark Among the Consumer Information Laws, 55 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1429, 1433–34 (2014). 
70 Id. at 1434–35, 1437–39. 
71 Colin Scott, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary Gov-
ernance, 29 J. L. & SOC’Y 56, 73 (2002). 
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been public.  For instance, in December 2013, the Federal Trade Commission 
sponsored a workshop, Blurred Lines: Advertising or Content? An FTC Work-
shop on Native Advertising, to discuss the impact of consumers on false adver-
tisement.72  The Federal Trade Commission identified that its pre-existing reg-
ulatory structure would likely prove to be flexible in regulating sponsored 
content.73 
This article has contemplated what may be the best vehicle for private reg-
ulation of sports-related, sponsored content by evaluating the ways in which 
harm could be experienced under the Lanham Act of 1946.  My analysis con-
cludes that private regulation within this arena might be insufficient, given the 
difficulty of capturing the harms at risk within the spectrum of sports-sponsored 
content.  Recovery under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act through trademark 
law or false advertising law may insufficiently capture the ways in which the 
advertiser and the content generator may work together to create content.  False 
advertising law may offer a way to regulate the content of the ad itself but might 
be insufficient to capture the potentially complicated relationships that might 
need to be disclosed to consumers.  The most potentially valid claim, false as-
sociation, suffers from competing theories of recovery that are insufficiently 
theorized with each other, and thus may not be usable in everyday litigation.  A 
serious question remains: Whether our regulatory model is sufficient for ad-
dressing the harms caused by sponsored content, an issue that is particularly 
compelling within the sports media context. 
 
 
                                         
72 See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 19. 
73 Id. 
